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ABSTRACT 
 
Managing security of medical information is currently experiencing significant challenges. "People issue" 
and "organization issue" have been identified as the most important challenges in this field. An 
organization internal threats have been considered as a serious danger which arise when the insiders 
commit fraud or steal sensitive information for personal monetary gain or to seek revenge. The 
organization is vulnerable to such attacks when the employees are compromising the organization’s 
security to get jobs done. On top of them, human resource managing is a daunting task especially when the 
organization has consultants, management personnel, partners, and other types of employees as well as a 
complex operational infrastructure. Insider attacks incur unfathomable losses to the organization through 
loss of revenue, reputation, intellectual property, and even human life.  As such, it is vital that the 
information system’s security management is secured and maintained regardless of the multitude of human 
factors involved. This paper analyze the internal organizational human factors that could cause an 
information security breach in Iraq hospitals. We collected 301 samples from internal officers of 5 major 
publicly held hospitals in Iraq to examine the malicious human factors (MHF) that threatening the patients’ 
personal information and measure the (MHF) to identify the most influential factors. 
 
Keywords: Health Care Information System, Information Security, Insider Threats, Malicious Human 
Factors 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Information system security management has 
become a priority for every organization that wants 
to succeed because of the advent of the digital age. 
It has driven the quest of many authors in analyzing 
threats faced by organizing information and ways to 
curb this ugly art. Though every many 
organizations' information might be of importance 
but the health care information cannot be 
compromised because it is only one life exist for 
every individual,  and [1, 2] viewed health care 
sector as most complex business endeavor with 
different kinds of interaction. On the other hand 
Meanwhile [3] exert some characteristics of a 
healthcare sector that makes it a business 
organization as having a business resource (time, 
people, money and business processes) to manage, 
a large staff and staff payroll, serves as a market 
where demand and supply takes place, and 
produces a large cash flow. [3] Highlights that the 
healthcare sector is a business because: It manages 
the same set of business resources as other types of 
organizations, including financial resources, 
personnel, equipment, supplies, technology and 
facilities. It employs a large complement of staff 
and has a large payroll. It serves as a marketplace 
and supplies valuable services to hundreds of 
customers daily. It procures a vast array of supplies, 
both pharmaceutical and technological. Time, 
people, money and business processes are managed 
to function efficiently. It is an economic engine that 
generates significant cash flows and provides 
economic value. Organizations are more vulnerable 
to insider attack since it is unlikely to be detected at 
the early stage.  Moreover, with the readily 
available authorized access and knowledge about 
the imperfection of the system [4, 5, 6, 7], such 
attack can be easily launched once tempted 
employees are presented with the opportunity [8]. 
At this point, health organizations one of the most 
important sectors that must be maintained their 
hospitals' information system security [9]. These 
organizations contains sensitive data concerning 
patients, any malicious action to destroy this system 
affect the reputation or the lives of human beings, 
as well as intellectual and material losses [10]. On 
2007 special investigation by The Times newspaper 
[11], it was reported that the medical record of Dr. 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Minister of Health in 
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South Africa from 1999 to 2008 under President 
Thabo Mbeki, was stolen from the private clinic 
where she was admitted. It was then passed on 
illegally to a news reporter, who used it to write an 
article by Sunday Times that exposed the minister’s 
behavior when she was admitted to the clinic. That 
caused a scandal and harmful to the Minister of 
health.  
 
The primary objective of this paper is to 
investigate deeply the human factors that 
compromise an information system’s security in 
terms of insider threat. And to figure out what are 
the meaning of malicious human factors and what 
is the reasons to cause threat act to the patients 
personal information in Iraq hospitals and what is 
the most influential factors among them, 
notwithstanding [12] opinion, i.e., “The only truly 
secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a 
block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room 
with armed guards.” Some organizations have 
failed to recognize such disaster [13, 8] that may 
befall when the employees are tempted to steal, 
destroy, or leak sensitive data because of personal 
vengeance, monetary gain, or to demonstrate their 
loyalty to third parties, ingratiation, coercion, thrills 
[14]. However previous studies have not been 
realized of all employees within the organization. 
While studies have been conducted on the 
(managers and employees) separately. Have not 
been addressed in one study.  Most of the studies 
used survey method and self-reported data. The 
limitation of self-reported data was unavoidable, 
thus the reliability of self-reported data is tenuous. 
In addition they turned to focus on policies and 
some security measures, followed inside the 
organization. But the problem lies in human 
behavior accurately and their motivations to blow 
their malignant actions. This study covered all the 
internal officers (managers and employees) and 
focuses on peer-reported data or officers-observed 
data to validate the results which include the 
managers and the employees.  
 
This paper is organized into five sections. First 
section starting with introductory of research 
problem, second section is an overview of 
literature, followed by the third section is research 
methodology and the tools that used for analyzing 
the results, then the fourth section we present the 
findings of this research, and finally in the fifth 
section we discuss the findings with the limitation 
and future work. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Insider threat originates from legitimate 
personnel who exploit their familiar environment 
and system for personal gains.  Even though the 
occurrence of such internal attack is not as frequent 
as external attacks, it is more likely to succeed and 
bring devastating effects.  According to the annual 
Computer Crime and Security Survey CSI/FBI 
survey results spanning eight years from 2000 [15], 
the reported incidents of internal attacks and insider 
abuse have topped the chart. The following sections 
give a clear picture to understand the internal 
threats, and who are cause these threats and what 
are the incentives for these threats. 
 
2.1 The Insider Threat is Occurs   
Insider threat refers to an individual with 
legitimate rights and authorization having the 
capability, motivation and opportunity to violate 
security and harm a business or an organization 
[16]. As a matter of fact, insider attack is most 
commonly launched by employees seeking revenge 
or financial gains, and such malicious insiders 
“plague” the employers who have employed them 
with good intentions [17, 18]. They prey on the 
loop holes in the security system that has been 
created by chance or due to ignorance.  In this 
aspect, the Computer Security Institute’s survey 
that was conducted in 2008 revealed that almost 
44% of all organizations have experienced 
computer system abuse. However, this number has 
been decreased to 30% in 2009. In addition, in 2008 
and 2009, approximately 42% of organizations 
reported some cases of laptops loss and 17% of 
them reported customers’ data robbery [15]. The 
results of a survey in 2009 [19] also indicate that 
25% of the respondents who participated in the 
study believed that insiders were responsible for 
almost 60% of the financial losses. They also 
believed that insiders have unauthorized (or 
privileged) access to almost 15 % of organization 
facilities. Moreover, the fourth most frequent event 
is insider’s abuse of internet access and e-mails. 
The results of both studies revealed that the threat 
of insiders is a fact to be considered. Further, this 
threat is increasingly turn into an external threat 
level. The following figure 1 illustrates some 
examples of the insiders’ threats. 
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Figure 1: Insider Threat [16] 
 
Based on the results of study for 500 or more 
patient reports, published by Department of Health 
and Human Services, over sixteen million person 
have been affected because of their information 
security breach [20, 9]. Another study published by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [21], it has been reported 
that about 42% of organizations are not totally 
aware of the source of incidents, implying the fact 
that they do not know whether the origin of attack 
was employees (either current or former), 
customers, partners, suppliers, hackers, or others. 
Besides, if no incident occurs, organizations have 
generally no idea whether insiders may be stealing 
or destroying information. I n this regard the next 
sections classify the insider threat factors. 
 
2.2 Insider Threat Factors 
To clearly understand the concept of an 
‘insider threat’, it is first essential to identify the 
elements that constitute the threat. In general, the 
threat of an insider may be intentionally, 
accidentally or due to ignorance [22]. Each type of 
insiders’ threats includes threat agents who are 
representative of an individual or group manifesting 
a threat [23, 24]. Based on “Threat-agent 
relationship” by [25], such agents have the 
following features in order to be a threat for an 
organization, an insider threat agent must have the 
capability, motivation, access to resource, 
opportunity, catalyst, inhibitors and amplifiers. 
These three components clearly discussed as the 
following: 
 
Threat Capability: The main components of 
capability required for an insider to be capable of 
making a threat for the organization have been 
pointed out by [26]. In fact, the effectiveness of 
insider’s attack highly depends on the insider threat 
agent’s capability i.e. the higher the capability is, 
the greater the threat would be [24]. It means that 
the agent has a great opportunity to attack and 
maintain the attack and destroy any replacements as 
well. In order to fulfill any attack, the agent 
requires the capability such as resources, 
knowledge, technology, and etc. 
 
Threat Motivation: An insider threat agent’s 
motivation is ranged from idle curiosity to 
malicious intensions. [25, 27, 2] summarizes 
different elements that motivate an insider agent to 
threat the organization. It is important to know that 
each employee in an organization may be a 
potential threat if they have the motivation to 
capitalize on their capacities and the opportunities 
they may have as they work in the organization 
[28]. The personal gain, revenge, competitive 
advantage, ideology or even a combination of them 
may be the underlying elements to evoke a 
malicious insider’s motivation. 
 
Threat opportunity: In order to execute an attack 
on the organization, an insider with the capability 
and motivation would need the opportunity to do so 
[29]. In this respect, [25], demonstrates the 
elements that create opportunity for an insider’s 
attack. The threats include misusing a user’s 
account or using a valid user’s account logged on in 
an unattended workstation. The insider can make a 
copy of sensitive documents, when the user is 
absent. 
 
2.3 Categorizing Insiders 
In any organization or business, each employee 
has a specific access level, which is based on his 
job profile. In addition, any other third party like 
clients, contractors are also provided with specific 
levels of access. In the current study, insiders are 
generally categorized as pure insider, insider 
associate, insider affiliate, and outside affiliate. It 
should be mentioned that this classification is based 
on the one made by Dr. Cole and Ring – authors of 
the book “Insider Threat: Protecting the Enterprise 
from Sabotage, Spying, and Theft” [30]. The 
different groups of threat agents are categorized in 
the following figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Categorizing Insider [30] 
 
A pure insider refers to an employee that is 
entitled to access the organization and its system 
for job purpose, though the entitlement is most of 
the time limited according to his or her job role.  
System administrators, on the contrary, have full 
access to the systems and networks, and thus, 
present a greater threat when he or she launches an 
attack.  Ironically, employees that have left the 
organization, regardless of their job roles, do not 
have their accounts deactivated. This, in fact, poses 
a threat to the security of the information systems 
and networks. The Insider associate refers the third 
party personnel like guards, cleaners, suppliers, and 
etc. as well as contractors that support the operation 
of an organization with restricted access to its 
facilities, systems, and/or networks. These 
personnel may advocate insider attack, especially 
after office hours, when they have unlimited access 
to the pure insiders’ work stations to retrieve 
sensitive information and/or documents without any 
surveillance. For example, collecting the username 
and password from a piece of post-it note attached 
to the cubicle. The affiliate of an insider includes 
the immediate family members, friends, and clients 
who are not authorized to access any system or 
network in the organization, but are able to launch 
an insider attack through the pure insiders’ 
credentials. This may come in a form of becoming 
an imposter to access the facilities, systems, and/or 
networks which includes, for instance, using the 
employee access card to enter the organization’s 
premises. And finally the outside affiliate are the 
unknown personnel who are not trusted by the 
organization, and thus are not allowed to retrieve 
any information through open access. However, 
with enough technical knowledge, they are able to 
initiate an encoded attack. The most obvious 
example is the hackers. 
 
2.4 Preliminary Research Model 
 
Based on the many different research studies by 
many scientists on the impact of human factors on 
the information security of an organization, it has 
been found that majority of the attacks are initiated 
by dissatisfied employees who are seeking revenge 
or tempted employees who are looking for financial 
gains, and thus triggered an insider ‘plague’ [16], 
.The abuse of system access and privileges are 
common. Most insider attacks generally start with 
abusing the system, and then violating security 
policies [31], according to the 2010 survey [32] 
72% of the insider incidents are handled internally. 
Cybersecurity Watch Survey, [32]. An insider 
threat agent’s motivation is ranged from idle 
curiosity to malicious intensions. Summarizes 
different elements that motivate an insider agent to 
threat the organization. It is important to know that 
each employee in an organization may be a 
potential threat if they have the motivation to 
capitalize on their capacities and the opportunities 
they may have as they work in the organization. 
The personal gain, revenge, competitive advantage, 
ideology or even a combination of them may be the 
underlying elements to evoke a malicious insider’s 
motivation [25, 22]. Based on the studies that 
mentioned above and other exploratory researches 
[8, 33, 34, 22] there are six personal characteristics 
believed to have positive direct implications for 
threat act from insider lead to risk of hospitals' 
information system that contains patients' personal 
information [35], in this regard figure 3 shows the 
hypotheses in form of research model and the 
following hypotheses was proposed: 
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Figure 3: Proposed Research Model 
 
 
2.5 Hypotheses Development  
 
According to figure 3. The hypotheses that 
proposed they were configured as a research model 
of this study to present the malicious human factors 
which is widely previewed in the following 
sections: 
H1: Desire for revenge is positively related to 
threat act. 
 
The human malignant act by some of the 
employees, generated by a motivation or a certain 
belief to attack their organization’s information 
system, in an intention of revenge from some 
colleagues. One of the reasons that some of the 
staff believes that their colleagues is not respect or 
detract them which will generate hatred. [36]. In 
this regard [37] refer that the weak link in an 
organization is the behavior of internal officers and 
their thoughts, [38, 39, 16] proved in their studies 
that desire of revenge can cause a big harm to 
hospitals information system. 
 
H2: Personal and social frustration is positively 
related to threat act 
 
To find out why employees may attack their 
organizations, to know when will be the attack, the 
link between potential attacks and malignant that 
may be behind some of the beneficiaries of access 
to personal data and disclosed, purpose behind it. 
There are factors which must be considered such as 
personal and social frustration and some other 
factors [25, 40, 41, 22]. The anger, alienation, and 
hatred lead to malignant behavior and reflect badly 
on the organization [27, 29] also pointed that 
personal and social frustration that the social 
environment in which the employee came from, 
affect the behavior inside the organization, one of 
the most important factors of hatred. According to 
[42, 43, 2], most studies refer that hatred of 
authority, tension and correlation these factors with 
anger, which is an important motivations in turn 
leads to the malignant behavior. [44] Suggests 
"trusteeship", meaning that the director or officer 
must be the guardian of the organization, and is 
aware for a malicious behavior of some staff, but 
unfortunately, this concept does not exist in some 
of them. In this regard [45] indicated that the 
workers will lead to many incidents inside the 
organization. 
 
H3: Computer dependency is positively related 
to threat act  
 
Unauthorized access to the organization 
information system and the computer devices to the 
rapid development in all areas of technology, which 
is a human challenge to break this technology [25, 
46, 47]. [48], most managers trusts the technology, 
the problem lies in the users of these technologies 
inside the organization, and the employee is 
considered the main threat to the organization 
information system [8]. In this regard [28] refers to 
some of the staff who has the desire to detect 
encrypted symbols, motives either a personal 
reflection of some malicious behaviors or by 
poverty is the exploitation of some workers to 
break the codes and steal information and the desire 
to challenge the information security measures. 
Advances in technology and offers many of the 
devices, leading to ease of movement and the 
workers opportunities to attack their organizations 
in this regard indicates that the organization should 
not rely on computers only [48]. 
 
H4: Ethical flexibility is positively related to 
threat act. 
 
The side of moral and ethics, which the staff 
professional and moral character and not tamper 
with the security of information that may lead lives 
of humans, confer a few other factors, a sense of 
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responsibility in case some of the workers know 
that their staff within the organization has 
intentions to attack or harm to their organization or 
has already happened, but nevertheless do not take 
any action or report that malignant behavior [27, 2] 
pointed that the workers ethical  lead to the failure 
of the organization if was bad. Ethics flexibility 
factor in study of [49,50, 51, 8] ,  shows a positive 
effect lead to threat act on  information system,  
insider risk can made a strong damage for 
organizations information system.  Some employee 
they can threat the organization information system 
for unethical reason, and lack of ethics by break the 
policies and rules can cause a disaster for the 
organizations [8].  [49] Flexibility refers to the 
work ethic, and that many of the cases from 
previous studies confirmed that this aspect has led 
to significant damage in the information security. In 
this regard [25] refer that the insider they have the 
capability to sabotage organizations information 
system. [49] indicates that the human factors aspect 
of this type is unintentional and, in turn poses a real 
danger to the security of information. 
 
H5: loyalty issues is positively related to threat 
act. 
 
The conflict between the employers, 
competition, dissatisfaction, and some workers are 
unhappy with his work. These factors affect the 
loyalty of employees to their organizations and 
become the focus on self-interest and loyalty to 
himself which reflect a bad behavior [52, 53]. The 
insiders they have the capability for any malicious 
behavior [54] and they ease to betrayal their 
organization [25, 40, 48, 8]. [50] A large part of 
insider threat adopted by trust and loyalty. 
systematic thinking to get out of this organization 
and to discuss these with responsible persons from 
outside the organization, leading to make way for 
two more to break this person through this gap, 
because this person behavior is not carrying the 
loyalty of his work [2]. 
 
H6: Lack of empathy is positively related to 
threat act. 
 
The lack of interest and sympathy with the staff 
by business managers and by colleagues at work, 
this factor leads to low self-esteem and mental 
illness, the employee leads to a reaction against the 
organization, and this is not the right of employee 
to combine the work with the integration of 
personal [8, 55, 16]. The insider they are a big 
challenge for any organizations [56], throughout the 
ages we see that the staff at least sympathy with the 
progress of time and this is due to fatigue at work 
and dealing with many cases leading to a lack of 
interest in working and abnormal behavior [54]. 
[25] refer that the insider they always have the 
intention and the motivate to attack the organization 
information system. 
  
3. DATA COLLECTION 
  
The researcher conducted our surveys at the 5 
major publicly held hospitals in Iraq, survey 
samples were written in English and then back-
translated into Arabic to ensure conceptual 
equivalence and comparability, all participants in 
our surveys were familiar with the hospital 
information system (IS). All of the surveys were 
conducted in the hospitals during the work time and 
the completed questionnaires were taken directly by 
the researcher early of 2013. All participants were 
assured of the confidentiality of their response 
before beginning the survey. The descriptive 
statistic used to describe the basic feature of the 
sample and shows the frequency distribution and 
histogram of the demographic variables, including 
gender, position, education, department, age, and 
years of experience. This kind of analysis helps us 
to know the respondent has adequate knowledge 
about risk in hospital. Initially 400 questionnaires 
were distributed to the internal officers, 301 
completed questionnaires were valid. we tested the 
Normality to check the distribution of data to make 
sure to use parametric or non-parametric test and 
we tests the Reliability, composite Reliability to 
check the reliability of questionnaire and the Factor 
Analysis to extract the factors, for this purpose each 
factor value is calculated by calculating the average 
of answer of each person to the related question to 
that factor and correlation to check the relation 
between the factors. We designed a questionnaire 
that was commensurate at the Iraqis’ health sector, 
we validated and refined the measurement scale of 
the proposed model, for an effective response scale 
ranging from 1 (‘‘strongly disagree’’) to 5 
(‘‘strongly agree’’). The partial least squares 
(SmartPLS 2.0) technique, which is a structural 
equation modelling technique, was applied to data 
processing. The PLS is widely used for empirically-
base studies due to its appropriateness for small 
sample sizes, and modelling and validating 
predictive models [57]. Importantly, PLS supports 
the assessment of both a measurement model and a 
structural model. Data analysis proceeded in a two-
step approach recommended by [58]: (1) an 
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analysis of the measurement model was conducted 
which aims to evaluate reliability and validity of 
the measures and (2) testing of structural 
relationships among latent variables followed. 
 
4. FINDINGS   
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
 
The results of the descriptive analysis are used 
to describe the basic feature of the sample. The 
descriptive analysis show the frequency distribution 
and histogram of the demographic variables, 
including gender, position, education, department, 
age, and years of experience. This kind of analysis 
helps us to know the respondent has adequate 
knowledge about risk in hospital. Depict the 
demographic characteristics of the study 
participants. Of the 301 respondents. 193 were male 
and 108 female, representing 64.3% and 36.7% 
respectively. 25.7% of the respondents aged 20 to 
29-year-old. The number of 30 to 40-year-old 
respondents was 117, which made up 38% of the 
entire respondent population. The third largest 
respondent group, constituting up to 22.7% of total 
respondents, aged 40 to 49-year-old. 12.3% of the 
respondents were in the 50 to 59-year-old age range 
while the remaining 1.3% was made up of 
respondents aged 60-year-old and above. On the 
other hand, most of the respondents, i.e., 33%, had 
a bachelor degree, 16.7% were diploma holders, 
14.71% were doctors of philosophy, 13.7% held a 
master’s degree, and the rest were higher diploma 
holders. Furthermore, 46.7% of the respondents 
were doctors, 23.3% were nurses, 15% were staff 
managers, 7.3% were employees, and 7% were 
managers. The departments being surveyed were 
ENT, Accouter, Research, Optometric, 
Orthopedics, and Pediatrics. Most respondents were 
either from the surgical (17.3%) or medical (16.7%) 
workforce. Lastly, 30.7% of the respondents had 
one to five years of experience while 25.7% of 
them had 11 to 15 years of experience. Based on 
the demographic information we understand this 
study covered all the internal officers in Iraq 
hospitals with all departments inside the hospitals 
and the power of collected data come from the 
well-educated of the respondents. 70% of them are 
graduates of universities and a large number of 
them higher degrees that reflect with the 
understanding of the importance of this study. In 
addition 73% of them in middle age that give good 
experience to understand the importance of 
information system security. On the other hand 
68.7% of respondents are managers and doctors 
that’s give more confident to collect data in such 
like this environments.    
 
4.2 Research Model Measurement 
 
4.2.1 Multicollinearity Estimation for 
Formative Construct 
 
Multicollinearity test is to limit if the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) < 3.3 [59]. Examine 
multicollinearity in case if the model having both 
reflective and formative constructs [60]. We then 
measure collinearity issue by testing the value of 
tolerance and VIF. The maximum VIF value for 
item is 1.289 for Personal and social frustration 
when as threat act chosen as dependent variable and 
minimum one is 1.122 for computer dependency 
while lack of empathy is 1.169, refer to Table 1 for 
construct VIF , Tolerance value and indicators 
weight. The results support that the formative 
measures of uncertain factors are reliable and valid. 
These values of VIF is less than 3.3 which mean it 
is strongly acceptable [59]. 
 
Table1: Formative Construct measurement 
 
indicator weight 
Tolerance VIF Social and Personal 
Frustration 
Q5 0.630 
.104 1.289 
Q6 -0.099 
Q7 -0.138 
Q8 0.340 
Q9 0.441 
Computer dependency  
Q10 0.252 
.161 1.122 Q11 0.542 
Q12 0.614 
Lack of empathy  
Q21 0.125 
.189 1.169 
Q22 0.481 
Q23 0.767 
Q24 0.181 
 
 
4.2.2 Validity and reliability for reflective 
constructs 
 
Convergent validity were used to assess the 
construct validity of the instruments used in this 
study. According to [61] construct validity is 
essential to ensure that a set of items actually 
represents the theoretical latent construct these 
variables were designed to evaluate. In addition to 
the standardized factor loadings in the confirmatory 
factor analysis, convergent validity in the present 
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study was examined by observing the value of 
composite or construct reliability (CR) and average 
variance extracted (AVE) for each construct. As 
noted by [61], CR values should be greater than 0.6 
while AVE should be above 0.5. CR value that is 
lower than 0.6 indicates that the items do not 
consistently measure the hypothesized latent 
construct and the value of AVE that is smaller than 
0.5 indicates that more error remains in the items 
than variance explained by the latent factor 
structure imposed on the measure [61]. The results 
of loading, AVE and CR are shown in Table 2. 
These results supported the convergent validity of 
each of the constructs involved in the proposed 
hybrid model of this study. 
 
Table 2: Reflective measurment constructs  
 
Indicator Loading 
AVE 
Composite 
Reliability Desire of revenge 
Q1 0.729 
0.545 0.782 Q2 0.737 
Q3 0.750 
Ethical flexibility 
Q15 0.647 
0.648 0.781 
Q16 0.937 
Loyalty issues 
Q17 0.503 
0.531 0.812 
Q18 0.689 
Q19 0.719 
Q20 0.939 
Threat act 
Q25 0.612 
0.530 0.769 Q26 0.831 
Q27 0.724 
Risk of hospitals’ information systems’ 
Q28 0.755 
0.565 0.796 Q29 0.743 
Q30 0.759 
 
Here, the reliability test was utilized in order to 
verify the consistency of the measurement scale for 
each construct and to purify the results via a 
reliability coefficient. Internal consistency of the 
measures exists if composite reliability (CR) and 
item loadings of each criterion exceed 0.7 [62]. All 
the values for internal consistency are met. The 
assessment of this validity is completed by using 
bootstrapping method to test t-values, and path 
coefficients for each construct and verify whether 
significant or insignificant these tests clarified in 
section 4.3. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses and structural model 
Testing 
 
With regarding to the evaluation of the 
proposed model, we evaluated path coefficients (the 
coefficients of the relationships between variables), 
to figure out if the hypotheses that proposed would 
support the research hypotheses or not support. We 
performed hypothesis testing by following [57] and 
the significance of each paths coefficient estimated 
by t- test using bootstrapping with 5000 
subsamples. The result of hypothesis testing 
including, t-value, p-value and β are indicated in 
Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results of hypotheses testing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables t-value p-value 
path 
coefficients 
β 
R2 Hypotheses 
Desire of revenge 3.893 0.000*** 0.232  Supported 
Personal and social frustration 2.225 0.026* 0.141  Supported 
Computer dependency 2.865 0.004** 0.170  supported 
Ethical flexibility 3.046 0.002** 0.179  Supported 
Reduced loyalty 1.863 0.063 0.130  Not Supported 
Lack of empathy 1.010 0.313 -0.067  Not supported 
Threat Act    0.246  
Risk of Hospitals’ Information 
Security System 
   0.232  
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According to table 3, desire of revenge has a 
positive influence on threat act construct was fully 
supported (β=0.232, T-value= 3.893). The result 
shows that desire of revenge is significantly related 
to the risk of hospitals’ information system. As well 
as the personal and social frustration has a positive 
influence on threat act construct was fully 
supported (β=0.141, T-value= 2.225). This result 
also explains that the personal and social frustration 
is significantly related to the risk of hospitals’ 
information system. It shows that there is a 
relationship between personal and social frustration 
and threat act. The empirical evidence of the 
computer dependency has a positive influence on 
threat act construct (β= 0.170, T-value= 2.865). 
Suggested that computer dependency factor is also 
related significantly with the risk of hospitals' 
information system Also the relationship between 
ethical flexibility and threat act construct (β=-
0.179, T-value= 3.046) has a positive influence and 
it is significantly related to the risk of hospitals’ 
information system. But we cannot claim the 
positive relationship between loyalty issues and 
threat act, because (β=0.130, T-value=1.863) shows 
that in this case loyalty issues has not a direct 
strong relationship with threat act. The result shows 
that loyalty issues is not significantly related to the 
risk of hospitals’ information system .The empirical 
evidence (β=-0.067, T-value= 1.010) shows that the 
lack of empathy has no influence on threat act 
construct. Thus, the hypothesis regarding the direct 
impact of threat act is not valid. In addition, 
examining the impact of threat act on risk of 
hospitals' information system, for the proposed 
hypotheses were found to be true. R-square scores 
for each dependent construct shows the percentage 
of construct’s variance: Threat act (R2 =0.246) 
which represent about 24% of the variation in threat 
act is explained by the six malicious human factors, 
while 23.2% of the variation in the risk of 
hospitals’ information system is explained by the 
model (R2 =0.232). 
As shown in figure 4, the model was tested by 
performing bootstrap approach to evaluate t-
statistics [63] of the linkage. the two- tailed t-value  
is conducted at 1.645, 1.96, and 2.576 critical 
values of  "t" at  significant  level (p-value)  0.1,  
0.05,  and  0.01  respectively  [64]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Structural model of hypotheses testing 
*Significant at 0.05 level          **Significant at 0.01 
level       ***Significant at 0.001 level                          
Insignificant path 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
influential variables that affect the hospitals' 
information system security. The proposed model 
subject to statistic testing is based on literature 
review, the results was interesting to observe that 
two hypotheses related to ‘‘malicious human 
factors’’ (H5 and H6) are not signiﬁcant and not 
valid. Our analyses show that ‘‘loyalty issues, and 
‘‘Lack of empathy" do not inﬂuence perception of 
‘‘threat act’’ of risk of hospitals' information 
system which previous literature review strongly 
found to be signiﬁcant and a positive influence on 
threat act and have relationship on the risk of 
hospitals’ information system. This finding 
contradicted to the significant positive relationship 
suggested by previous studies. One possible 
explanation of the resulted insignificant relationship 
may due to the inaccurate measure of perceived 
social pressure, or belief based measurement 
approach may provide more accurate measure by 
first identifying the accessible referents, i.e., the 
people whose opinions are important to the 
surveyed person as a sensitive information. An 
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alternative interpretation of the insignificant 
relationship for computer dependency construct 
may not be a direct determinant of the intention to 
perform security breach it could be resulted due to 
adverse information security incidents and the 
ignorance of using the technology in time that most 
managers trust the technology, the problem lies in 
the users of these technology inside the 
organization. And there is a possible explanation 
regarding the lack of empathy construct that is the 
concept of “threat act” on risk of hospitals’ 
information system security doesn’t have 
relationship with the sympathy of the employees to 
their organization or another possible explanation is 
the employees’ estimation of the value, sensitivity 
or importance of the organizational data was not 
merely based on monetary evaluation. The 
hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H4) proposed positively 
have impact on risk of hospitals’ information 
system security in this study shows that the 
variables desire of revenge, personal and social 
frustrations, computer dependency and ethical 
flexibility positively influence on threat act 
construct and significantly related to risk of 
hospitals’ information system security this findings 
is compatible with the previous studies. 
 
Finally this research examined a comprehensive 
model of malicious human factors (see Figure 3) 
via surveying 301 respondents in Iraq hospitals'. 
This model is unique in the sense that it has been 
developed based on the data obtained from both 
ﬁeld study and literature .The data were analyzed 
through structural equation modeling (Partial Least 
Square) approach. One of the most important 
ﬁndings was the identiﬁcation of six-variables of 
insider threats to information system security. In 
the previous studies, researchers confirmed that all 
the tested variables it have significant impact on 
information system security (ISS). But this study 
brings out a new results and shows some variables 
have no influence on ISS, which reﬂects in new 
understanding for human behavior. Which 
represent some of malicious human factors as 
unintentional threat act, could be human errors, 
accidental incidents or ignorance. Another 
significant contribution of this research the results 
can help the Iraq hospitals to look deeply to the 
impact of insider threats, trying to avoid many 
cases of employee’s abuses on their ISS, that’s 
come from the practice and knowledge that they got 
from this study. The limitation of this study is the 
comparatively small sample size and the number of 
organizations. Another limitation of this study. The 
samples collected from health care/hospital 
organizations, which has special policies 
concerning the data is sensitive compared to other 
organizations. This research essentially examined 
the entire research model that has been given a very 
clear indication of what malicious human factors 
are. And examined which factor are more 
influential, also we identify how the malicious 
human factors could interrelate to each other. Sure, 
that serious series only captured after a certain 
amount of the view, but that this study have 
contributed to understanding why pretending the 
perspective. We have tested our knowledge using a 
survey of 301 people and that's can show the 
hypotheses panel is correct. Also, in order to further 
understand certain element that came up from the 
survey. Suggestion for the future study could be 
extracted and explore in detail and examine the 
factors individually. This study focused on the 
malicious human factors. In the future, it will be 
possible to compare between these factors and the 
organization's culture or the examination of these 
factors on the other organizations are not within the 
health sector.  
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